Koffei

CVE-2021-33045

🟠 Medium In CISA KEV

Dahua IP cameras, video intercoms, PTZ domes, thermal cameras and additionally NVR and XVR recorders — and the OEM rebrands, which are the inventory trap: RVi, ST-XVR, QVC, AC-D, SNR and EZ-IP speak the same protocol on TCP 37777, while Amcrest, Lorex, Annke and Swann sit on Dahua's cloud backend. Filtering a CMDB on "Dahua" misses much of the estate · Builds from before mid-2021. Fixed builds carry a .R.2107xx datestamp, so the practical test is a build date later than July 2021, read at Settings > System Information > Version Information. Dahua's own model table is wider than the CVE record's

CVSS (Koffei note)
9.8
CVSS (v3.1, CVE List)
9.8
EPSS (2026-11-18)
99.593%
99.95th percentile
CISA KEV
2024-08-21
due 2024-09-11

Exploitation

Yes — CISA KEV since 21/08/2024 (SSVC 05/09/2024: exploitation active, automatable yes, technical impact total). Listed by CISA in AA24-249A (05/09/2024) among the public exploits used by GRU Unit 29155, which is what appears to have driven the KEV listing. Used again in Operation CameraSwarm, where the p2pwn tool implementing both bypasses backdoored 1,923 cameras inside a 14,530-device compromise between 17/06/2026 and 22/07/2026, concentrated in Ukraine and Russia (Hunt.io, 18/08/2026). No named botnet family is attributable to either CVE in any source checked — Hunt.io calls CameraSwarm an assembled open-source toolkit rather than a botnet. Public exploit since October 2021 (bashis / mcw0) ; no Metasploit module. Two traps: p2pwn self-labels its backdoor as CVE-2024-39943, which is actually a Rejetto HFS flaw, and neither CVE-2024-39943 nor CVE-2025-31702 was exploited in the observed attacks, so neither belongs on a Dahua row

Timeline

  1. 15/09/2021CVE record published (CVE List)
  2. 21/08/2024Added to the CISA KEV catalogue
  3. 11/09/2024CISA deadline for US federal agencies
  4. 28/10/2026Dahua IP cameras hijacked en masse in Ukraine

Risk

9.8 Critical (v3.1, CISA-ADP — the Dahua CNA publishes no metric, and Dahua's own advisory scores it 8.1 base / 7.3 temporal) — AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, EPSS 99.593% (99.95th percentile) (CWE-287 identity-authentication bypass, a different mechanism from CVE-2021-33044 : the firmware reads the claimed source address out of the request body, so an attacker who claims to be 127.0.0.1 is treated as local, over DHIP on TCP 37777 — again an unauthenticated admin session in under a second)

Fix

Yes — firmware later than July 2021 (Dahua DHCC-SA-202106-001, 01/09/2021, revised V1.1 on 15/11/2021 ; also circulated as SA-2021-0130). No workaround exists: a firmware update is the only remedy, and the CVE's own vendor reference URL is dead. Patching does not evict an intruder — the p2pwn / p2password account planted during Operation CameraSwarm survives a password change and, on most firmware, a factory reset, and harvested recovery codes stay valid until Dahua changes its server-side derivation

Official description

The identity authentication bypass vulnerability found in some Dahua products during the login process. Attackers can bypass device identity authentication by constructing malicious data packets.

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H