CVE-2026-102895
🔴 High In CISA KEVGPUStack — the API, reached through a same-host reverse proxy or a spoofed real-IP header · < 2.2.0 (fixed in 2.2.0)
93.20th percentile
due 2026-11-12
Exploitation
POST /v2/inference-backends/from-yaml. CISA KEV itself could not be reached this run, so the KEV line rests on the records and on the coverage citedTimeline
- 04/11/2026CVE record published (CVE List)
- 09/11/2026Added to the CISA KEV catalogue
- 11/11/2026CISA KEV: OpenSSH "SSHole" + three critical pre-auth flaws
- 12/11/2026CISA deadline for US federal agencies
Risk
force_auth_localhost false, the default, GPUStack treated a loopback request source as the built-in administrator. A remote request can be made to look like 127.0.0.1 through a same-host reverse proxy peer or a client-supplied X-GPUStack-Real-IP header, so an unauthenticated attacker acts as administrator)Fix
force_auth_localhost to true is the configuration control, and the header path means a reverse proxy in front is not a mitigation but part of the attack surfaceOfficial description
GPUStack is an open-source GPU cluster manager for AI model serving and GPU instance provisioning. Prior to 2.2.0, get_current_user in gpustack/api/auth.py treated a loopback request source as the built-in administrator when force_auth_localhost was false, which was the default. A remote request could appear to originate from 127.0.0.1 because client_ip_getter accepted a same-host reverse proxy peer or a client-supplied X-GPUStack-Real-IP loopback value. The bypass allowed unauthenticated administrative access, including user and model changes, persistent administrator API-key creation, disclosure of worker and cloud-provider secrets, and code execution through POST /v2/inference-backends/from-yaml. Exploitation was observed in the wild against a 2.1.1 deployment. This issue is fixed in version 2.2.0.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CWE-287,CWE-290,CWE-346