Koffei

CVE-2026-102895

🔴 High In CISA KEV

GPUStack — the API, reached through a same-host reverse proxy or a spoofed real-IP header · < 2.2.0 (fixed in 2.2.0)

CVSS (Koffei note)
9.8
CVSS (v3.1, CVE List)
9.8
EPSS (2026-11-18)
5.730%
93.20th percentile
CISA KEV
2026-11-09
due 2026-11-12

Exploitation

Yes — CISA KEV since 09/11/2026, federal deadline 12/11/2026. The CNA record itself states that exploitation was observed in the wild against a 2.1.1 deployment, and the vendor documented an attack that used malicious inference backends to launch reverse shells, reported by researcher Javier Sixto. The record has no CISA-ADP container at all, so there is no SSVC triage and no kev block inside it, and the KEV listing comes from the coverage. What an attacker gets is the whole stack: user and model changes, persistent admin API keys, worker and cloud-provider secrets, and code execution through POST /v2/inference-backends/from-yaml. CISA KEV itself could not be reached this run, so the KEV line rests on the records and on the coverage cited

Timeline

  1. 04/11/2026CVE record published (CVE List)
  2. 09/11/2026Added to the CISA KEV catalogue
  3. 11/11/2026CISA KEV: OpenSSH "SSHole" + three critical pre-auth flaws
  4. 12/11/2026CISA deadline for US federal agencies

Risk

9.8 Critical (v3.1, GitHub CNA) — AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, EPSS 0.555% (46.66th percentile, scored 10/11/2026) — a 0.55% EPSS on a KEV-listed flaw with confirmed exploitation, which is the clearest reminder in this batch that EPSS lags a niche product (CWE-287, CWE-290 and CWE-346 : with force_auth_localhost false, the default, GPUStack treated a loopback request source as the built-in administrator. A remote request can be made to look like 127.0.0.1 through a same-host reverse proxy peer or a client-supplied X-GPUStack-Real-IP header, so an unauthenticated attacker acts as administrator)

Fix

Yes — 2.2.0 (release). Setting force_auth_localhost to true is the configuration control, and the header path means a reverse proxy in front is not a mitigation but part of the attack surface

Official description

GPUStack is an open-source GPU cluster manager for AI model serving and GPU instance provisioning. Prior to 2.2.0, get_current_user in gpustack/api/auth.py treated a loopback request source as the built-in administrator when force_auth_localhost was false, which was the default. A remote request could appear to originate from 127.0.0.1 because client_ip_getter accepted a same-host reverse proxy peer or a client-supplied X-GPUStack-Real-IP loopback value. The bypass allowed unauthenticated administrative access, including user and model changes, persistent administrator API-key creation, disclosure of worker and cloud-provider secrets, and code execution through POST /v2/inference-backends/from-yaml. Exploitation was observed in the wild against a 2.1.1 deployment. This issue is fixed in version 2.2.0.

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

CWE-287,CWE-290,CWE-346