Koffei

CVE-2026-12523

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Cloudflare quiche (HTTP/3) · ≥ 0.1.0 and < 0.29.3

CVSS (Koffei note)
7.5
CVSS (v3.1, CVE List)
7.5
EPSS (2026-11-18)
0.532%
45.68th percentile

Exploitation

Probable — public PoC (FoxIO) ; no in-the-wild exploitation found (SSVC: none) ; not in KEV

Timeline

  1. 14/07/2026CVE record published (CVE List)
  2. 23/10/2026QPACK amplification research against HTTP/3 servers

Risk

7.5 High (v3.1, Cloudflare CNA) — AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H, EPSS 0.532% (CWE-400 : the HTTP/3 layer pre-allocates memory from the declared frame length without requiring the bytes to be sent and does not correctly apply QPACK decompression limits, so crafted frames commit far more memory than MAX_FIELD_SECTION_SIZE advertises and exhaust the host)

Fix

Yes — 0.29.3 (GHSA-4fgf-9xrr-88gf) — set_max_field_section_size() is the limit that was not being enforced, so configuring it is not a workaround

Official description

Summary Cloudflare quiche's HTTP/3 layer was discovered to be vulnerable to resource exhaustion (i.e., memory) by means of specially crafted HTTP/3 frames. Impact HTTP/3 defines multiple frame types to support HTTP message exchanges and connection management. Each frame has a length and a payload whose length depends on the frame type. quiche was found to be vulnerable when parsing some frame types to pre-allocating memory based on the declared length. An attacker would not need to send the number of declared bytes to trigger this issue. In addition, quiche was found to not apply QPACK decompression limits correctly. This could allow an attacker to send specially crafted HEADERS frames that would cause more memory commitment than otherwise advertised by MAX_FIELD_SECTION_SIZE (configured by set_max_field_section_size()). Mitigation: * Users are requested to upgrade to quiche 0.29.3 which is the earliest version containing the fix for this issue. Credits: Disclosed responsibly by Sébastien Féry

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H