Koffei

CVE-2026-20127

🔴 High In CISA KEV

Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller (formerly vSmart), SD-WAN Manager (formerly vManage) and SD-WAN Validator (formerly vBond) — regardless of device configuration, across on-premises, Cisco-hosted SD-WAN Cloud, Cisco-managed and FedRAMP deployments · 20.9 → 20.9.8.2 ; 20.11 → 20.12.6.1 ; 20.12 → 20.12.5.3 or 20.12.6.1 ; 20.13, 20.14 and 20.15 → 20.15.4.2 ; 20.16 and 20.18 → 20.18.2.1 ; anything earlier than 20.9 has to migrate to a fixed release. Read the advisory's table with care: footnote markers render as trailing digits ("20.111" for 20.11), and the footnoted releases have reached End of Software Maintenance

CVSS (Koffei note)
10.0
CVSS (v3.1, CVE List)
10.0
EPSS (2026-11-18)
87.620%
99.76th percentile
CISA KEV
2026-02-25
due 2026-02-27

Exploitation

Yes — CISA KEV since 25/02/2026 (SSVC 26/02/2026: exploitation active, automatable yes, technical impact total), and Cisco's PSIRT states it is aware of limited exploitation. The advisory reached version 2.1, marked Final, on 28/10/2026, which is later than the CVE record's own last update of 16/06/2026. Cisco names no threat actor, though it links a Talos post whose URL references UAT-11473 / KeyDrift ; separately Lumen tied this CVE to Volt Typhoon's "Silent Train" relay network alongside CVE-2024-39717 and CVE-2026-16812, both already in this report. Reported by the Australian Signals Directorate's ACSC. No public PoC found Update 30/10/2026: the Talos post Cisco links is published (28/10/2026) and names UAT-11473 and the KeyDrift toolset against this CVE. Talos assesses with high confidence that UAT-11473's infrastructure overlaps considerably with Volt Typhoon's "Silent Train" but does not claim they are the same actor, and Lumen's own Silent Train post does not mention UAT-11473, so the link runs one way only. Targeted sectors: space and satellite, defence and aerospace, policy research. No victim count or exploitation volume is published. Host artefacts from Talos: /tmp/system-vdaemon, /var/tmp/vdaemon.conf, /var/tmp/vdaemon.bin, libdssl.so, libcommon.so, conf_sshd, rsshd, /etc/sv/sshd/ and /etc/sv/aaamgr/ ; Talos states no hardcoded IPs, ports or domains were recovered. Snort SIDs 65938 and 65958 for the CVE, 67387 to 67416 and 7:44 to 7:73 for the artefacts. Relevance held at 🔴 on 30/10/2026 under the amended recency test. The 🔴 test now keys its 60-day window on the most recent confirmed exploitation rather than on the CISA KEV listing date. This row fails the old test (KEV 25/02/2026, 247 days ago, and patched) and passes the new one: Cisco's PSIRT still reports limited exploitation, and Talos published on UAT-11473 / KeyDrift on 28/10/2026, a cluster it assesses as overlapping Volt Typhoon infrastructure. Corroboration: the Daily CyberNews notes of 29/10 and 30/10/2026 both record it, the second describing it as back under exploitation by new malware stealing inter-site encryption keys.

Timeline

  1. 25/02/2026Added to the CISA KEV catalogue
  2. 25/02/2026CVE record published (CVE List)
  3. 27/02/2026CISA deadline for US federal agencies
  4. 29/10/2026"KeyDrift" malware deployed via Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN flaw
  5. 30/10/2026Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN auth bypass gets new malware attribution
  6. 30/10/2026"KeyDrift" malware steals Cisco SD-WAN encryption keys
  7. 30/10/2026Volt Typhoon's "Silent Train" covert-access network detailed

Relationships

CVE-2026-16812CVE-2026-16812CVE-2025-8876CVE-2025-8876CVE-2025-8875CVE-2025-8875CVE-2024-39717CVE-2024-39717CiscoCiscoVolt TyphoonVolt TyphoonUAT-11473UAT-11473CVE-2026-20127CVE-2026-20127

exploits suspected named in the same story vendor · Select a box to open its page · All relationships

Risk

10.0 Critical (v3.1, Cisco CNA) — AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H, EPSS 89.294% (99.78th percentile) (CWE-287 : peering authentication does not work properly, so crafted requests log in to a Controller as an internal, high-privileged, non-root account, from which NETCONF is reachable and the SD-WAN fabric configuration can be changed, yielding administrative privileges. Unauthenticated and no user interaction)

Fix

Yes — the fixed releases above. Cisco states there are no workarounds, only temporary mitigations: on-premises deployments should restrict ports 22 and 830 to known controllers and trusted IPs by ACL, security group or firewall rule, while Cisco-hosted SD-WAN Cloud environments have guardrails in place. Hunting, from the advisory: audit /var/log/auth.log for Accepted publickey for vmanage-admin entries from unknown IPs, and validate peering events against known System IPs Note on provenance: the auth.log hunt string above is Cisco's, from the advisory ; Talos does not mention it.

Official description

A vulnerability in the peering authentication in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller, formerly SD-WAN vSmart, Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager, formerly SD-WAN vManage, and Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Validator, formerly SD-WAN vBond, could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass authentication and obtain administrative privileges on an affected system. This vulnerability exists because the peering authentication mechanism in an affected system is not working properly. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted requests to an affected system. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to log in to an affected Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller as an internal, high-privileged, non-root user account. Using this account, the attacker could access NETCONF, which would then allow the attacker to manipulate network configuration for the SD-WAN fabric. 

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

CWE-287