Koffei

CVE-2026-48710

🔴 High In CISA KEV

Starlette (Python ASGI framework, Kludex) and what pulls it in: FastAPI installs, LiteLLM, vLLM, MCP SDK servers; Red Hat AI Inference Server, AAP 2.6/2.7, OpenShift AI, Satellite 6.17-6.19, RHEL AI 3.0 (17 RHSA per OpenCVE); Debian DSA-6302-1 · Before 1.0.1

CVSS (Koffei note)
6.5
CVSS (v3.1, CVE List)
6.5
EPSS (2026-11-18)
70.288%
99.40th percentile
CISA KEV
2026-09-02
due 2026-09-16

Exploitation

Yes — CISA KEV since 02/09/2026 (due 16/09/2026, ransomware use "No" per a KEV mirror; the CISA catalogue itself was not read). Most recent dated exploitation: SANS ISC honeypots, 14-15/11/2026, chained with CVE-2026-42271 for unauthenticated RCE on LiteLLM, with malformed Host headers such as localhost] meant to slip past PoC-based filters. Earlier: Microsoft (26/08/2026) saw the chain used to drop XMRig on LiteLLM gateways. Correction of the earlier entry: this row said "Not confirmed" and 🟡 Low, but the CVE has been in KEV since 02/09/2026 (the Daily notes of 03/09 to 10/09/2026 already reported it under attack) and was exploited again inside the 60-day window, so it is raised 🟡 → 🔴 (tested 17/11/2026). A Qilin link (Wiz, via The Hacker News 03/09/2026) comes with no confirmed ransomware deployment. Public PoC and a nuclei template are referenced (not opened; sploitus not checked). cyberveille RSS: checked 17/11/2026 (feed up to 16/11/2026), no result

Timeline

  1. 26/05/2026CVE record published (CVE List)
  2. 02/09/2026Added to the CISA KEV catalogue
  3. 03/09/2026CISA KEV: seven flaws added
  4. 08/09/2026CISA KEV: seven newly exploited flaws
  5. 10/09/2026CISA adds 7 more flaws to KEV catalog amid active exploitation
  6. 16/09/2026CISA deadline for US federal agencies
  7. 17/11/2026Fresh scans for the LiteLLM and Starlette pre-auth RCE chain

Relationships

CVE-2026-20316CVE-2026-20316CVE-2026-20079CVE-2026-20079CVE-2026-0257CVE-2026-0257CVE-2024-21762CVE-2024-21762CVE-2023-27532CVE-2023-27532StarletteStarletteQilinQilinCVE-2026-48710CVE-2026-48710

exploits suspected named in the same story vendor · Select a box to open its page · All relationships

Risk

6.5 Medium (v3.1) — AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N, EPSS 70.288% (OpenCVE and vulmon agree) (CWE-444 per the CNA, CWE-1289 per NVD and Red Hat. "BadHost": Starlette does not validate the Host header before rebuilding request.url, so a malformed Host makes request.url.path differ from the requested path and bypasses checks built on it. Found by X41 D-Sec in an OSTIF-funded vLLM audit. Rechecked 17/11/2026: the earlier cell held no score ("Authentication bypass (Host header)"))

Fix

Yes — v1.0.1 (falls back to scope["server"] for malformed Host values); for the LiteLLM chain also LiteLLM 1.83.7

Official description

Starlette is a lightweight ASGI framework/toolkit. Prior to version 1.0.1, the HTTP `Host` request header was not validated before being used to reconstruct `request.url`. Because the routing algorithm relies on the raw HTTP path while `request.url` is rebuilt from the `Host` header, a malformed header could make `request.url.path` differ from the path that was actually requested. Middleware and endpoints that apply security restrictions based on `request.url` (rather than the raw `scope` path) could therefore be bypassed. Users should upgrade to a version greater than or equal to version 1.0.1, which validates the `Host` header against the grammar of RFC 9112 §3.2 / RFC 3986 §3.2.2 when constructing `request.url` and falls back to `scope["server"]` for malformed values.

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

CWE-444