Koffei

CVE-2026-89407

🟠 Medium

jackson-core · com.fasterxml 2.17.0-2.18.10, 2.19.0-2.21.6, 2.22.0-2.22.2; tools.jackson 3.0.0-3.1.6, 3.2.0-3.2.1

CVSS (Koffei note)
7.5
CVSS (v3.1, CVE List)
7.5
EPSS (2026-11-18)
0.837%
58.46th percentile

Exploitation

Probable — public PoC (SSVC: poc, CISA-ADP 2026-09-22); no exploitation reported; not in KEV. Not in the 0day "In the Wild" sheet (checked 18/11/2026). cyberveille RSS: checked 18/11/2026 (feed 19/10 to 17/11/2026), no result (automated enrichment)

Timeline

  1. 22/09/2026CVE record published (CVE List)
  2. 18/11/2026CERT-FR relays Oracle's off-cycle November update for six product lines

Risk

7.5 High (v3.1, CNA (HeroDevs)) — AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H, EPSS 0.837%, 58.35th percentile, scored 2026-11-17 (CWE-1333, CWE-400: NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber() uses a PATTERN_FLOAT regex that backtracks quadratically on non-matching input; JSON coerced to numbers can cause DoS, not bounded by the default maxStringLength.)

Fix

Yes — Oracle Database Server: Oracle cspunov2026 (17/11/2026) ; component fix per record: 2.18.11, 2.21.7, 2.22.3, 3.1.7, 3.2.2

Official description

NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber() in FasterXML jackson-core pre-validates "stringified numbers" with two regular expressions: PATTERN_FLOAT ([+-]?[0-9]*[\.]?[0-9]+([eE][+-]?[0-9]+)?), present since 2.17.0, and PATTERN_FLOAT_TRAILING_DOT, added in 2.17.2. PATTERN_FLOAT places adjacent quantifiers over the same character class -- an optional [0-9]* run, an optional dot, then a required [0-9]+ run -- so input that ultimately fails to match forces Java's backtracking engine to retry every possible split point of the digit run.  Matching cost therefore grows with the square of the input length.  An attacker who can supply JSON that an application deserializes into a numeric target type reaches this method through jackson-databind's default String-to-number coercion (StdDeserializer and NumberDeserializers for BigDecimal, BigInteger, Double and Float).  Because StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength defaults to 20,000,000 characters, no constraint bounds the input before it reaches the regex.  Testing by the reporter confirmed O(n^2) growth across five consecutive input-size doublings, with a single 160,000-character string consuming roughly 74 seconds in one call; a small number of concurrent requests of ordinary body size can therefore exhaust a server's request-handling thread pool.  The affected method does not exist before 2.17.0, so 2.16.x and earlier releases are not affected.  The fix replaces both regular expressions with a hand-rolled single-pass scan.

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

CWE-1333,CWE-400