SCKit
Also tracked as RelayTrap toolkit; rogue ScreenConnect client campaign against MSPs
3days in Daily CyberNews
1linked CVEs
4ATT&CK techniques
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Context
Operators used ScreenConnect's Run Command on cloud-hosted panels to push sc.msi / sckit-run.bat and a PowerShell decoder (ns.mo7sen[.]dev), install two rogue ScreenConnect clients, add Defender exclusions and AppLocker rules, and use the RelayTrap module to steal technicians' session cookies (.ASPXAUTH) and push SYSTEM commands to other managed endpoints. Wave 1 on 11/11/2026: 288 endpoints at 48 organisations in about 90 minutes; wave 2 from 13/11/2026 16:12 UTC: 205 hosts at 41 organisations, rogue client on 185.241.211[.]197 (1337 Services bulletproof hosting) (Huntress). RelayTrap attempts a guest-to-host transfer tied to CVE-2026-84869, but Blackpoint saw the 26.6.5 fix hold and no successful propagation, and Microsoft (13/11/2026) quotes ConnectWise that the fix blocks the toolkit's spread, so the link is hedged. Huntress ties the intrusions to the RMM+ extension (1.0.31 / 1.0.32, blank access key); Blackpoint found no technical link with the five extensions ConnectWise disabled
Not stated (no actor named — Huntress, Blackpoint, Microsoft)
In the news
- 🔴 18/11/2026ConnectWise warns MSPs as SCKit keeps hitting ScreenConnect
- 🔴 16/11/2026SCKit: second wave of rogue ScreenConnect clients, and no proven link to the disabled extensions
- 🔴 12/11/2026SCKit: worm-capable toolkit built to spread through technicians' ScreenConnect sessions
- 🔴 12/11/2026Rogue ScreenConnect clients hit 288 endpoints at 48 organisations in 90 minutes