CVE-2025-41451
🟠 MediumDanfoss AK-SM 8xxA Series refrigeration system managers. Found by Claroty Team82 through coordinated disclosure, as one of three: this one for command execution, CVE-2025-41450 for the authentication bypass that supplies the login it needs, and CVE-2025-41452 for a denial of service. Chained with CVE-2025-41450 the privilege requirement disappears, which is why the 8.7 understates the pair · Before 4.3.1
91.62th percentile
Exploitation
exploit-tagged reference. That is CISA recording a public proof of concept, not exploitation. The repository was not opened. A campaign against this exact product family is confirmed, and nothing links it to this CVE. CERT-FR alert CERTFR-2026-ALE-012 of 12/10/2026, revised 13/10 and 16/10, reports numerous compromises of refrigeration controllers and says the campaigns are probably still ongoing ; the attacks ran overnight on 11 to 12/10/2026 and forced continuous defrost in French supermarkets. The alert cites no CVE, names no vulnerability, records the risk as "not specified by the vendor", and names no threat actor, and its scope is wider than Danfoss, covering Copeland xweb and Dixell xweb supervisors too. Danfoss told franceinfo that most affected devices were obsolete AK-SM800 and AK-SC355 units, end-of-life and no longer patched, then told Cooling Post that some were current products on outdated firmware including AK-SM800A, naming no firmware version. The CVE link is a researcher hypothesis, not a finding: Matt Suiche's FROMAGEGATE is described by its author as a reconstruction of a suspected chain. No actor has been named by CERT-FR, by Danfoss, by Claroty or in any press reporting read for this row. Updated 09/11/2026 after SentinelOne Labs published its assessment on 03/11, revised 04/11, and this materially changes the row. Three things follow from it. First, a national agency now positively excludes these flaws rather than merely failing to name them. SentinelOne paraphrases ANSSI director Vincent Strubel's testimony to the French Senate of 21/10/2026: the agency's assessment of the French cases pointed to exposed administration interfaces and weak passwords, and indicated that the Claroty vulnerabilities were not the ones exploited. SentinelOne does not quote ANSSI directly and the statement covers the French cases only. This row previously said nothing linked the campaign to this CVE ; the position is now stronger than that. Second, the access path as reported is configuration, not a vulnerability: controllers reachable on public IP addresses, reached through the supervisory platform's own management interface, after which the attacker changed temperature and defrost setpoints using the product's intended functions. But press reporting conflicts with ANSSI on one point that matters here. Accounts of the French incidents describe controllers accepting the username admin with the current date as the password, and tie that to Claroty's "code of the day" research — which is the mechanism of CVE-2025-41450. So one source excludes these CVEs while another describes one of them as the way in. The likeliest reconciliation is that ANSSI treats a date-derived default credential as a weak password rather than as exploitation of the flaw, but no source read states that, and it is recorded here as an unresolved conflict rather than settled either way. Third, no actor has been established, and that is now a sourced statement rather than an absence. SentinelOne: "Responsibility for the European incidents has not been publicly established." It calls Russian-aligned disruptive actors one credible hypothesis, resting on the precedent of CARR and NoName057(16) rather than on evidence from these incidents ; it discusses Z-Pentest ; and it reports NoName057(16) and Z-Pentest claims, including an alleged set of Danfoss-associated credentials, as unverified, explicitly not establishing that credentials enabled the incidents. An Iran-linked suspicion exists but concerns the US military commissary cases only and is described as officials' provisional and unverified view. Ken Munro of Pen Test Partners suggested the culprits could have been "kids messing around", given how easy the access was. The campaign has also grown well beyond the 11–12/10 night this row was written around. A second wave on 02–03/11/2026 hit supermarkets in Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Estonia, Ireland and Portugal, with further reports from Germany, Italy and Finland ; around 700 French stores were affected in the first wave ; three EFS blood banks in France were targeted and the attack was thwarted ; and at least six US military commissaries suffered failures between late August and 01/09/2026. UK NCSC's Richard Horne called it "the beginning" on 04/11/2026. The second wave's access path is not known. SentinelOne records that Portugal's Mosqueteiros group said the Intermarché incidents appeared to involve an external refrigeration-management provider, and that a German operator described an attack involving its remote refrigeration-maintenance company, making third-party access a lead to investigate — while stating that this establishes no single compromised provider, no common intrusion path and no compromised update channel.Timeline
- 22/08/2025CVE record published (CVE List)
Relationships
exploits suspected named in the same story vendor · Select a box to open its page · All relationships
Risk
Fix
Official description
Improper neutralization of alarm-to-mail configuration fields used in an OS shell Command ('Command Injection') in Danfoss AK-SM8xxA Series prior to version 4.3.1, leading to a potential post-authenticated remote code execution on an attacked system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:H/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
CWE-77