Koffei

CVE-2025-41452

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Danfoss AK-SM 8xxA Series refrigeration system managers. The third flaw of the Claroty Team82 set, with CVE-2025-41450 for the authentication bypass and CVE-2025-41451 for command execution · Before 4.3.1

CVSS (Koffei note)
6.8
CVSS (v4.0, CVE List)
6.8
EPSS (2026-11-18)
0.930%
61.31th percentile

Exploitation

No confirmed exploitation of this CVE. SSVC 19/10/2026: exploitation poc, automatable no, technical impact partial ; not in CISA KEV, and covered instead by CISA ICS advisory ICSA-25-140-03. A campaign against this exact product family is confirmed, and nothing links it to this CVE. CERT-FR alert CERTFR-2026-ALE-012 of 12/10/2026, revised 13/10 and 16/10, reports numerous compromises of refrigeration controllers and says the campaigns are probably still ongoing ; the attacks ran overnight on 11 to 12/10/2026 and forced continuous defrost in French supermarkets. The alert cites no CVE, names no vulnerability, records the risk as "not specified by the vendor", and names no threat actor, and its scope is wider than Danfoss, covering Copeland xweb and Dixell xweb supervisors too. Danfoss told franceinfo that most affected devices were obsolete AK-SM800 and AK-SC355 units, end-of-life and no longer patched, then told Cooling Post that some were current products on outdated firmware including AK-SM800A, naming no firmware version. The CVE link is a researcher hypothesis, not a finding: Matt Suiche's FROMAGEGATE is described by its author as a reconstruction of a suspected chain. No actor has been named by CERT-FR, by Danfoss, by Claroty or in any press reporting read for this row. Claroty's own caveat on this flaw is worth keeping: it did not establish that the denial of service would stop refrigeration equipment, only the web management interface Updated 09/11/2026 after SentinelOne Labs published its assessment on 03/11, revised 04/11, and this materially changes the row. Three things follow from it. First, a national agency now positively excludes these flaws rather than merely failing to name them. SentinelOne paraphrases ANSSI director Vincent Strubel's testimony to the French Senate of 21/10/2026: the agency's assessment of the French cases pointed to exposed administration interfaces and weak passwords, and indicated that the Claroty vulnerabilities were not the ones exploited. SentinelOne does not quote ANSSI directly and the statement covers the French cases only. This row previously said nothing linked the campaign to this CVE ; the position is now stronger than that. Second, the access path as reported is configuration, not a vulnerability: controllers reachable on public IP addresses, reached through the supervisory platform's own management interface, after which the attacker changed temperature and defrost setpoints using the product's intended functions. But press reporting conflicts with ANSSI on one point that matters here. Accounts of the French incidents describe controllers accepting the username admin with the current date as the password, and tie that to Claroty's "code of the day" research — which is the mechanism of CVE-2025-41450. So one source excludes these CVEs while another describes one of them as the way in. The likeliest reconciliation is that ANSSI treats a date-derived default credential as a weak password rather than as exploitation of the flaw, but no source read states that, and it is recorded here as an unresolved conflict rather than settled either way. Third, no actor has been established, and that is now a sourced statement rather than an absence. SentinelOne: "Responsibility for the European incidents has not been publicly established." It calls Russian-aligned disruptive actors one credible hypothesis, resting on the precedent of CARR and NoName057(16) rather than on evidence from these incidents ; it discusses Z-Pentest ; and it reports NoName057(16) and Z-Pentest claims, including an alleged set of Danfoss-associated credentials, as unverified, explicitly not establishing that credentials enabled the incidents. An Iran-linked suspicion exists but concerns the US military commissary cases only and is described as officials' provisional and unverified view. Ken Munro of Pen Test Partners suggested the culprits could have been "kids messing around", given how easy the access was. The campaign has also grown well beyond the 11–12/10 night this row was written around. A second wave on 02–03/11/2026 hit supermarkets in Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Estonia, Ireland and Portugal, with further reports from Germany, Italy and Finland ; around 700 French stores were affected in the first wave ; three EFS blood banks in France were targeted and the attack was thwarted ; and at least six US military commissaries suffered failures between late August and 01/09/2026. UK NCSC's Richard Horne called it "the beginning" on 04/11/2026. The second wave's access path is not known. SentinelOne records that Portugal's Mosqueteiros group said the Intermarché incidents appeared to involve an external refrigeration-management provider, and that a German operator described an attack involving its remote refrigeration-maintenance company, making third-party access a lead to investigate — while stating that this establishes no single compromised provider, no common intrusion path and no compromised update channel.

Timeline

  1. 22/08/2025CVE record published (CVE List)

Relationships

CVE-2025-41451CVE-2025-41451CVE-2025-41450CVE-2025-41450DanfossDanfossZ-PentestZ-PentestNoName057(16)NoName057(16)CyberAv3ngersCyberAv3ngersCVE-2025-41452CVE-2025-41452

exploits suspected named in the same story vendor · Select a box to open its page · All relationships

Risk

6.8 Medium (v4.0, Danfoss CNA) — AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:H/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:H, EPSS 0.925% (60.54th percentile, scored 04/11/2026) — no NVD score and no second scorer (CWE-15 external control of a system or configuration setting : an authenticated function replaces the headers.conf file and reloads the Nginx configuration, inserting routing directives. A request to a planted route then raises an unhandled exception in the sm_app process, and repeated triggering denies service to the web management interface)

Fix

Yes — firmware R4.3.1 or later. CERT-FR's own guidance matters more than the patch here, and one line of it is easy to miss: remove internet exposure, review the whole configuration including defrost schedules, restore access only through a VPN (contractor source-IP filtering is an emergency measure, not a fix), set Danfoss Strict security mode and change default passwords. For a unit already compromised, restart or factory reset, then reconfigure before returning it to service — and note CERT-FR's warning that a factory reset alone is insufficient, because it removes persistence but leaves the device open to re-compromise. One correction to the order of operations, from SentinelOne, 09/11/2026: before restarting or factory-resetting a unit, preserve its logs and configuration records where safely practicable, and coordinate recovery with refrigeration staff so physical safety and safe operating conditions come first. The guidance above says to restart or reset ; doing that first destroys the only evidence of what was changed. SentinelOne also carries the December 2025 joint advisory for OT operators, whose relevant items here are: scan your own IP ranges for exposed systems including connections set up by third parties, segment IT from OT, use MFA where possible and strong unique passwords where it is not, limit remotely accessible accounts to view-only, review setpoint ranges and alert on deviations, keep backups of controller configurations, practise manual operation, and for any exposed system with weak or default credentials assume compromise: isolate it, review unusual authentications and recent connections, reissue credentials and report to the authorities. One investigative step rather than a hardening one: check whether shared accounts, gateways or administrative infrastructure connect several affected sites.

Official description

Post-authenticated external control of system web interface configuration setting vulnerability in Danfoss AK-SM8xxA Series prior to 4.3.1, which could allow for a denial of service attack induced by improper handling of exceptional conditions

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:H/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:H

CWE-15